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Brokers-REAL ESTATE BROKERS' DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE 
PURCHASERS-Funk U. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Benjamin and Betty Lou Funk inquired a t  the office of Ward 
Tifft, a licensed real estate broker in Idaho, about purchasing 
some real property. A salesman showed them certain property 
listed with the Tifft Agency. The following day, the Funks wrote 
a check for $100 to the Tifft Agency as an earnest-money deposit 
and signed an agreement to purchase the property for $30,000, 
with $1,000 to be paid upon acceptance of the offer and "pay- 
ments of $100 per month for fifteen months, followed by a lump 
sum payment of $5,000 and payments of $150 per month there- 
after."' Tifft mailed the Funk offer to the owner, but before the 
owner received that offer, Tifft called the owner and stated that 
he and two of his business associates were mailing an offer of 
$30,000 for the same property, with terms of $6,000 down and 
payments of $300 per month. The owner accepted the offer of 
Tifft and his associates. A month later, in response to a telephone 
call from the Funks, Tifft returned the $100 earnest-money de- 
posit and informed the Funks that their offer had been rejected. 
Upon learning that Tifft had purchased the property, the 
Funks sued to have Tifft and his associates declared constructive 
trustees of the property with the Funks as beneficiaries. The 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed 
their complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Tifft had breached 
the fiduciary duties he owed the Funks, and directed the imposi- 
tion of a constructive trust. 
Traditionally, the real estate buyer-seller relationship has 
been one of caveat emptor.* Since the broker in a real estate 
transaction is usually the seller's agent, the buyer-broker rela- 
1. Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1975). 
2. See Comment, Caveat Emptor! The Doctrine's Stronghold, 1 WILLAMEVE L.J. 369 
(1960). Courts are increasingly abandoning the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sales of 
new homes by builder-vendors. See generally Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor 
or Caveat Venditor?, 24 ARK. L. REV. 245 (1970); Note, Commercial Law-Implied War- 
ranties in Sales of Real Estate-The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, 22 DE PAUL . REV. 
510 (1972); Note, Caveat Emptor and the Morals of the Housing Market, 20 N.Y.L.F. 803 
(1975). Congressional legislation has also reduced the impact of caveat emptor on certain 
subdivision land sales. See Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. (j 1701- 
20 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1701-03 (Supp. IVY 1974); Comment, Protecting the 
Buyer: New Regulations Under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 1974 WIS. 
L. REV. 558. 
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tionship has also been one of caveat e m p t ~ r . ~  Consequently, real 
estate brokers historically have not had any fiduciary or affirma- 
tive obligations to prospective  purchaser^.^ Courts have generally 
held brokers liable to buyers only when the broker was acting as 
the buyer's agent5 or when the buyer could prove fraud on the part 
of the broker? 
Contrary to the traditional rule of caveat emptor, however, 
some modern courts have held that although the real estate bro- 
ker is primarily the seller's agent, the broker nevertheless has 
3. Huttig v. Nessy, 100 Fla. 1097, 130 So. 605 (1930); Ripy v. Cronan, 131 Ky. 631, 
115 S.W. 791 (1909); McLennan v. Investment Exch. Co., 170 Mo. App. 389, 156 S.W. 
730 (1913); Linnemann v. Summers, 95 N.J. Eq. 507, 123 A. 539 (Ch. 1924); Comment, A 
Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 
1343, 1345 (1972). 
Usually both the real estate seller and his agent deal a t  arm's length with the pur- 
chaser. 35 BOST. U.L. REV. 604, 607 (1955). A real estate broker hired by the owner of land 
to find a purchaser is ordinarily the owner's agent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY $ 
13b (1958). 
The real estate broker-seller relationship is fiduciary in nature. See, e.g., Reese v. 
Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958). The broker owes his principal, the seller, the 
duties of loyalty, skill, and full disclosure. He cannot act for persons having interests 
adverse to those of the seller without the seller's consent. See, e.g., Schepers v. Lautensch- 
lager, 173 Neb. 107, 112 N.W.2d 767 (1962). Thus, historically, a real estate broker has 
been bound to act for his principal alone, using utmost good faith in his principal's behalf. 
See Lister v. Sakwinski, 206 Mich. 121, 172 N.W. 397 (1919). 
4. Fish v. Teninga, 330 Ill. 160, 161 N.E. 515 (1928); Ries v. Rome, 337 Mass. 376, 
149 N.E.2d 366 (1958); Latson v. Buck, 89 Neb. 28, 130 N.W. 970 (1911); Buckley v. 
Hatupin, 198 Wash. 543, 89 P.2d 212 (1939); see Sanders v. Stevens, 23 Ariz. 370, 203 P. 
1083 (1922); Wilkes v. Rankin-Whitten Realty Co., 65 Ga. App. 341, 16 S.E.2d 170 (1941); 
Ripy v. Cronan, 131 Ky. 631, 115 S.W. 791 (1909); DiBurro v. Bonasia, 321 Mass. 12, 71 
N.E.2d 401 (1947); cf. Klotz v. Fauber, 213 Va. 1, 189 S.E.2d 45 (1972). 
5. Pouppirt v. Greenwood, 48 Colo. 405, 110 P. 195 (1910); Rogers v. Genung, 76 N.J. 
Eq. 306, 74 A. 473 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909); Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710,276 N.W. 
849 (1937); Mitchell v. Allison, 54 N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949); Rice v. First Nat'l Bank, 
50 N.M. 99, 171 P.2d 318 (1946); Johnson v. Nippert, 294 Pa. 464,144 A. 404 (1928); Volz 
v. William D. Burkheimer, Inc., 173 Wash. 49, 21 P.2d 285 (1933); cf., Coover v. Cox, 95 
Cal. App. 1, 272 P. 343 (2d Dist. 1928). 
6. Dunshee v. Novotny, 77 Colo. 6, 233 P. 1114 (1925); Lear v. Bawden, 75 Colo. 385, 
225 P. 831 (1924); Isenbeck v. Burroughs, 217 Mass. 537, 105 N.E. 595 (1914); Hokanson 
v. Oatman, 165 Mich. 512, 131 N.W. 111 (1911); Sawyer v. Tildahl, 275 Minn. 457, 148 
N.W.2d 131 (1967); Collins v. Philadelphia Oil Co., 97 W. Va. 464, 125 S.E. 223 (1924); 
Booker v. Pelkey, 173 Wis. 24, 180 N.W. 132 (1920). The courts are not in agreement as 
to what facts rise to the level of actionable fraud. For example, in Sanders v. Stevens, 23 
Ariz. 370, 376, 203 P. 1083, 1085 (1922), the court stated that "a false representation as to 
the owner's lowest price is not actionable, because it is not a representation of a material 
fact." The court in Collins v. Philadelphia Oil Co., 97 W. Va. 464, 470, 125 S.E. 223, 225 
(1924), however, held that such a misrepresentation did constitute fraud and stated that 
a buyer has a right to rely on the broker's statement of the seller's minimum price. In some 
cases where a broker has been held liable for misrepresenting the seller's price, the courts 
have noted that the buyer was inexperienced and unfamiliar with real estate values. See, 
e.g., Hokanson v. Oatman, 165 Mich. 512, 131 N.W. 111 (1911). 
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certain duties to a potential buyer to deal honestly and fairly with 
him and to communicate accurately the buyer's offer and the 
seller's price. Courts have held brokers liable for breach of these 
affirmative duties to buyers in cases where the broker has under- 
taken to act on behalf of the buyer,' concealed or failed to com- 
municate the buyer's offer,8 or made damaging misrepresen- 
tations to the buyer concerning the seller's price.g These courts 
have based their conclusions that real estate brokers owe poten- 
tial buyers certain obligations on either of two theories: (1) a 
fiduciary relationship exists between the broker and the buyer,'" 
or (2) public policy requires brokers to act in an honest and ethi- 
cal manner toward potential buyers." 
A. Fiduciary Relationshipt2 
The Supreme Courts of Florida and Connecticut have held 
7. Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927); cf. Van Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla. 
189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943) (broker's extensive involvement with buyer's transactions); Siler 
v. Gunn, 177 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E. 2d 427 (1968) (dual agency). See also note 5 supra. 
8. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Harper v. Adametz, 142 
Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946); Van Woy 
v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 
(1927); Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955). 
9. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Harper v. Adametz, 142 
Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946); Van Woy 
v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943); Siler v. Gunn, 117 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E.2d 
427 (1968). 
10. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 
805, 113 So. 419 (1927); Siler v. Gunn, 117 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E.2d 427 (1968); cf. Van 
Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943) (broker owes buyer duties, although the 
court did not expressly find a fiduciary relationship); Stevens v. Reilly, 56 Okla. 455, 156 
P. 157 (1916) (confidential relation). 
11. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 
25 So. 2d 4 (1946); Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955). 
12. The Restatement defines a fiduciary as 
a person having a duty, created by his undertaking to act primarily for the 
benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking. Among the 
agent's fiduciary duties to the principal is the duty to account for profits arising 
out of the employment, the duty not to act as, or on account of, an adverse party 
without the principal's consent, the duty not to compete with the principal on 
his own account or for another in matters relating to the subject matter of the 
agency, and the duty to deal fairly with the principal in all transactions between 
them. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13a (1958). Bogert gives a similar definition of the 
duties of a fiduciary: 
[Fiduciaries] must employ the principal's property for his benefit . . . . They 
are held to the highest amount of good faith, are required to exclude all selfish 
interest, ?re prohibited from putting themselves in positions where personal 
interest and representative interest will conflict, and must, in any direct dealing 
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real estate brokers liable for affirmative misrepresentations and 
for failure to communicate the buyer's offer by concluding that a 
fiduciary relationship exists between the broker and a potential 
buyer.I3 In Quinn v. Phipps,l"he Florida court found that the 
broker's fiduciary duties arose from the buyer's reliance on the 
broker's oral agreement to communicate the buyer's offer and to 
negotiate with the seller on the buyer's behalf. The court reasoned 
that a real estate broker invites public confidence,'%nd that a 
fiduciary relationship should be found wherever influence is ac- 
quired and abused or confidence is reposed and betrayed? The 
court rejected the broker's argument that since he had been em- 
ployed by the seller, he could not at  the same time have been an 
agent for the buyer. The court asserted that even if the broker had 
been the seller's agent, his exclusive contract to sell the property 
would not have conflicted with his agreement to submit the 
buyer's offer.17 By concealing the buyer's $50,000 offer and pur- 
chasing the property for himself for $45,000,1R the broker breached 
a fiduciary duty to the buyer. The court accordingly upheld a 
constructive trust on the land for the buyer's benefit? 
In a later case, Van Woy v. Willi~,~O the Florida court relied 
on Quinn's broad definition of a fiduciary relationship to find that 
with the principal, make full disclosure of all relevant facts and give the latter 
an opportunity to obtain independent advice. 
G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481 (2d ed. 1964) 
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]. 
13. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 
805, 113 So. 419 (1927); cf. Van Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943). 
14. 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). 
15. 93 Fla. at  815, 113 So. a t  422. 
16. Id. a t  808-12, 113 So. a t  420-21. The court further stated that "[tlhe origin of 
the confidence is immaterial. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations and 
those informal relations which exist wherever one man trusts in and relies upon another." 
Id. a t  809-10, 113 So. a t  421 (citations omitted). 
The Quinn court seems to conclude that fiduciary and confidential relations are 
synonymous. Other courts have distinguished these two terms, defining "fiduciary rela- 
tion" as being applicable only to legal relationships between parties-such as guardian 
and ward, administrator and heirs, trustee and cestui que trust, and principal and 
agent-while finding that the term "confidential relation" covers all other relationships 
"wherein confidence is rightfully reposed and . . . exercised." Roberts v. Parsons, 195 Ky. 
274, 278, 242 S.W. 594, 596 (1922); BOGERT $ 5  481, 482. 
17. 93 Fla. a t  820, 113 So. a t  424. The court further stated that "[ilf there were 
reasons known to [the broker] why he could not carry out his agreement with [the 
buyer], it was his duty to fully disclose such reasons to [the buyer]." Id. at 820-21, 113 
So. a t  424. 
18. Id. a t  811-12, 113 So. a t  421. 
19. Id. a t  828, 113 So. a t  427. 
20. 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943). 
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the broker owed the buyer certain duties which were fiduciary in 
nature,21 despite the fact that he was not the buyer's agent.22 The 
broker in Van Woy had falsely represented to the buyer that he 
was the seller's exclusive agent. Then, after misrepresenting that 
the property could not be purchased for less than $75,000,20 the 
broker used the buyer's money to purchase the property for him- 
self for $37,500 and resold it to the buyer for $75,000.24 The court 
found that the broker's duties to the buyer arose from the broker's 
extensive involvement in helping the buyer purchase the prop- 
ertye2" 
In Harper v. A d a r n e t ~ , ~ '  the Connecticut Supreme Court 
found a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the buyer2? 
even though the broker had clearly been employed by the seller.2R 
The broker had fraudulently misrepresented the seller's mini- 
mum price and failed to communicate the buyer's offer. After 
purchasing the property for himself, the broker resold a small 
part of the property to the buyer, telling him that the seller had 
decided to retain the balance of the property in his family.29 Al- 
though the broker was not the buyer's agent, the court concluded 
that the buyer had a right to assume that the broker would both 
"deal honestly with him and be faithful to his principal [the 
seller]."30 The court held that the broker's conduct had been 
fraudulent and that the broker had breached the fiduciary duties 
21. Id. a t  199-203, 14 So. 2d a t  190-192. 
The Van Woy court discussed various authorities and cases concerning the obligations 
on the broker that result from agency and fiduciary relationships. After reviewing the 
broker's dealings with the buyer, the court concluded that even "if [the broker] was not 
the agent of the [buyer] in these several transactions, certainly he was due her certain 
duties and obligations, arising out of the relationship then existing between them." Id. at  
203, 14 So. 2d a t  192. The court did not, however, expressly find a fiduciary relationship 
between the broker and the buyer. 
22. Id. at  198-99, 14 So. 2d a t  190. 
23. Id. at 191, 14 So. 2d a t  186. 
24. Id. at  195-96, 14 So. 2d a t  188-89. 
25. The broker accepted the buyer's check in downpayment on the property, repre- 
sented her a t  the closing, and assisted her in obtaining and refinancing a loan for the 
purchase of the property. Id. a t  203, 14 So. 2d a t  192. 
Id. 
26. 142 con;. 218,113 A.2d 136 (1955). 
27. The Harper court stated: 
[Elquity has carefully refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in pre- 
cise detail and in such a manner as to exclude new situations. It has left the 
bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side 
and a resulting superiority and influence on the other. 
lt 225, 113 A.2d at  139 (citations omitted). 
28. Id. at  221-22, 113 A.2d a t  138. 
29. Id. a t  220-23, 113 A.2d a t  137-38. 
30. Id. at  224, 113 A.2d at  139. 
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he owed to the buyer? Therefore, the court upheld a constructive 
trust on the "retained" property in favor of the buyer.:'2 
In these three cases, the brokers had dealt dishonestly with 
prospective purchasers by making significant misrepresentations 
and by concealing the purchasers' offers. The courts in each of 
these cases, however, had little evidence upon which to base a 
finding of a fiduciary relationship between the broker and buyer. 
In Quinn, the broker's agreement merely to communicate the 
buyer's offer and to negotiate with the seller on the buyer's behalf 
was held to be sufficient grounds for finding a fiduciary relation- 
ship. The court in Van Woy found that the broker's extensive 
involvement in helping the buyer purchase the property imposed 
on him affirmative obligations to the buyer. In Harper, the court 
found a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the buyer 
despite the absence of even these tenuous bases. Thus, it appears 
tha t  the courts in all three cases strained to find fiduciary 
relationships upon which to hold the dishonest brokers accounta- 
ble to the buyers. The facts in Quinn and Van Woy apparently 
did not rise to the level of actionable fraud. In Harper, however, 
although it had concluded that the broker's actions were fraudu- 
lent," the court further found a breach of a fiduciary relationship. 
Apparently as the result of the brokers' extremely unethical and 
31. Id. a t  224-26, 113 A.2d at  139. A vigorous dissent asserted that the broker had no 
duties to refrain from buying the property himself or to disclose to the buyer that he had 
bought the property, inasmuch as the broker was admittedly not the buyer's agent and 
the facts did not support the existence of any confidential relationship between the par- 
ties. The dissent further rejected the majority's conclusion that the buyer had been de- 
frauded since the buyer had not sustained any actual damage. Id. at  226-28, 113 A.2d at 
140-41. 
32. Id. a t  224-26, 113 A.2d at  139. 
It has been suggested that the Connecticut court strained in Harper to find a fiduciary 
relationship between the broker and the buyer in order to impose a constructive trust. See 
35 BOST. U.L. REV. 604,605-06 (1955). It appears that the Harper court had little evidence 
from which to find a fiduciary relationship and that the court failed to consider the 
conflicts and problems resulting from such a finding. The court did not, however, have to 
find a fiduciary relationship in order to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of the 
purchaser since it had already concluded that the broker had defrauded the buyer. 142 
Conn. a t  223-24, 113 A.2d at  138-39. 
A constructive trust is a remedy devised for the purpose of furthering justice and 
frustrating fraud. Fraud in this context includes all conduct which is "unfair, unconscion- 
able, and unjust." Whenever equity finds a wrongful retention of property, 
it will give relief, whether the type of injustice is new or old. The court does not 
restrict itself by naming all the specific forms of inequitable holding which will 
move it, but rather reserves complete liberty to apply this remedy to whatever 
knavery human ingenuity can invent. 
BOGERT § 471 (footnotes omitted). 
33. See note 32 supra. 
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dishonest conduct, the Florida and Connecticut courts were per- 
suaded to find the broker-buyer relationships in these cases were 
fiduciary in nature.34 
B. Public Policy 
In cases with facts similar to the three cases discussed above, 
the Supreme Courts of Florida, California, and Louisiana con- 
cluded that although a fiduciary relationship did not exist be- 
tween the broker and buyer, public policy, as expressed in the 
state statutes, requires brokers to act in an honest and ethical 
manner toward These courts found that brokers owe 
duties to potential buyers as members of the public because of the 
status given to, and responsibilities imposed on, licensed real 
estate brokers by the state statutes. Affirmative misrepresen- 
tation and a failure to communicate the buyer's offer were held 
to constitute a breach of the broker's statutory duty to deal fairly 
and honestly with prospective purchasers. 
In Zichlin v. Dill,36 the broker allegedly had falsely told the 
buyer that the seller's minimum price was $5,500. The broker 
then made a $1,000 secret profit by purchasing the property for 
himself with the buyer's money and then reselling it to the 
The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that a real es- 
tate broker is an exception to the general rule that an agent is 
responsible only to his principal, and reversed the lower court's 
dismissal of the complaint. The court noted that a real estate 
broker in Florida enjoys statutory privileges and responsibilities, 
citing a Florida statute that requires applicants for a brokerage 
license to be honest, trustworthy, of good character, and fair.3R In 
- -- -- 
34. See 35 BOST. U.L. Rev. 604, 45-08 (1955). 
35. Cases cited note 11 supra. 
36. 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946). 
37. Id. a t  97, 25 So. 2d a t  4. Furthermore, "[tlhe broker induced [the buyer] not 
to engage an attorney to represent her in closing the transaction saying he would attend 
to all details and record the deed." Two weeks after the closing, the buyer learned that 
she had taken a deed to the property from the broker, not the original seller. Id. 
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § §  475.01 to .49 (1941), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. $ 5  475.01 
to .49 (Supp. 1975-76). The Zichlin court quoted § 475.17 from the 1941 Florida Statutes: 
"All applicants who are natural persons shall be competent, honest, truthful, trustworthy, 
of good character, and bear a reputation for fair dealing . . . ." That section now reads: 
An applicant for registration . . . shall be required to make it appear. . . [that 
he] intends [to be] . . . honest, truthful, trustworthy, of good character, and 
that he bears a good reputation for fair dealing. An applicant . . . shall be 
required to make it appear that he is competent and qualified to make real 
estate transactions and conduct negotiations therefor with safety to investors 
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the court's view, the state law "granted [brokers] a form of 
monopoly, and in doing so the old rule of caveat emptor is cast 
aside. Those dealing with a licensed broker may naturally assume 
that he possesses the requisites of an honest, ethical man.""' 
In a California case, Ward v. T~ggar t ,~"  the real estate broker 
misrepresented to a prospective buyer both the seller's minimum 
price and that the broker was the seller's agent. The broker used 
the buyer's money to purchase the property himself; then he re- 
sold it to the buyer a t  a profit." The court held that, despite the 
absence of a fiduciary or agency relationship between the broker 
and the buyer, public policy would not allow the broker to fraudu- 
lently take advantage of a potential buyer.j2 The court, relying on 
certain California statutes concerning real estate brokersJ" and 
fraudulent conduct,44 stated that a licensed real estate broker has 
a "duty to be honest and truthful in his dealings."VJnder Cali- 
fornia law, an applicant for a brokerage license may be required 
to submit proof of his honesty and good reputation.16 Further- 
more, a broker's license may be revoked if he is guilty of 
"[mlaking any false promises of a character likely to influence, 
persuade, or induce ."47 
The broker in Arnato v. Latter & Blum, Inc.j8 failed to com- 
municate to the seller the plaintiff-buyer's offer of $9,500; then 
the seller accepted an offer of $9,250. Consequently, the plaintiff, 
needing the property for the expansion of his business, could not 
and to those with whom he may undertake a refationship of trust and confidence 
9 ,  
. . . .  
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.17 (Supp. 1975-76). 
39. 157 Fla. a t  98, 25 So. 2d at 4-5. 
40. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959). 
41. Id. a t  739-40, 336 P.2d at  536. 
42. Id. at  741, 336 P.2d at  537. 
43. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§  10150, 10176 (West 1964), as amended,  CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE $ 8  10150, 10176 (West Supp. 1975); see note 46 infra. 
44. "No one can take advantage of his own wrong." CAL. CIV. CODE 4 3517 (West 
1970). "One who gains a thing by fraud . . . or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some 
other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit 
of the person who would otherwise have had it." Id. § 2224. 
45. 51 Cal. 2d a t  741, 336 P.2d a t  537. 
46. The Ward court relied on CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE $ 10150 (West 1964), which 
required that an applicant for a brokerage license submit with his application two recom- 
mendations certifying that the applicant was "honest, truthful and of good reputation." 
Section 10150 has since been amended, deleting that requirement for applicants. However, 
10152 has continued to require that, a t  the request of the commissioner, an applicant 
must submit proof of his "honesty, truthfulness and good reputation." CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 10152 (West Supp. 1975). 
47. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10176(a), (b) (West Supp. 1975). 
48. 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955). 
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acquire the property from the new owner for less than $25,000.-'" 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, reversing the trial court's dis- 
missal of the complaint, stated that under Louisiana statutes5(' 
brokers owe legal duties to buyers as members of the public? 
These statutes require the State Real Estate Board to inquire into 
the honesty, truthfulness, and reputation of all applicants for 
brokerage licenses,52 and further required the broker to "honestly 
conduct his business and pay all damages which may result from 
his actions as a real estate broker or from the actions of his sales- 
men. "53 
The causes of action sustained in both Zichlinu and Ward 
were based on allegations that the brokers had misrepresented 
the sellers' prices, concealed the buyers' offers, and used the buy- 
ers' money to make secret profits for themselves. The court in 
Amato, however, held that a broker may be liable to a buyer for 
damages resulting from a mere failure to convey the buyer's offer, 
even though the broker's conduct in that case did not appear to 
be fraudulent. Thus, a broker's implied statutory duty to act in 
an honest and ethical manner may extend beyond liability for 
affirmative misrepresentations and concealment of a buyer's offer 
to entail liability for a failure to accurately and immediately 
convey a buyer's offer, regardless of the buyer's ability to prove 
fraud. 
49. Id. at 539-40, 79 So. 2d at 874. 
50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§  37:1431-59 (1974). 
51. 227 La. a t  540-43, 79 So. 2d at 874-76. 
52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§  37:1438(3), 1438.1 (1974). 
53. Id. 4 37:1447. 
The Amato court quoted further from the Louisiana statutes to justify their decision, 
227 La. a t  541, 79 So. 2d at 875: 
Anyone who is injured or damaged by the broker or his salesmen by any 
wrongful act done in the furtherance of such business or by any fraud or misre- 
presentation by the salesmen or broker may sue for the recovery of the damage 
. . . . [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1447 (1974)l 
The dissent in Amato argued that although these statutes were enacted by the Louis- 
iana legislature "in the interest and for the protection of the public," the statutes, particu- 
larly § 37:1447, were only intended to protect those members of the general public to whom 
the agent or broker owed a duty either pursuant to a contract or by operation of law. The 
broker in Amato did not owe any duties to the buyer, for "[nlo language is contained 
[in the statutes] indicating an intention to impose new or additional duties on real 
estate agents or to create relationships between them and other parties not theretofore in 
effect." 227 La. at 544-45,79 So. 2d a t  876 (dissenting opinion). For a casenote supporting 
the dissent on this point see 69 HARV. L. REV. 559 (1956). 
54. In Zichlin, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a lower court dismissal of the 
plaintiffs complaint. 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946). 
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C. Traditional View 
Many courts have not yet departed from the traditional view 
of the broker-buyer relationship that the broker owes no fiduciary 
duty to a potential buyer. Some of these courts have refused to 
extend the broker's liability to potential buyers in cases with facts 
similar to those discussed above." For example, in Ries v. Rome,56 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adhered to the tra- 
ditional view. The broker misrepresented to the buyer the status 
of certain property, took advantage of confidential information 
the buyer had communicated to him, and sold the property to an 
associated broker.57 The court denied relief to the would-be buy- 
ers and held that the brokers, as agents of the sellers, owed no 
fiduciary duties to the buyers.58 
In Klotz v. Fauber," the broker failed to transmit the buyer's 
offer to the seller and purchased the land for himself."The Su- 
preme Court of Virginia refused to hold the broker liable. The 
court cited Quinn,(' Harper,62 am at^,^^ and WardM for the limited 
rule that a broker is liable to a buyer for failure to communicate 
the buyer's offer only when the broker purchases the property a t  
a price equal to or less than the price the prospective buyer agreed 
to pay.65 Since the plaintiff-buyer in Klotz had not alleged that 
his offer equaled or exceeded the price the broker paid, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Apparently, the Virginia 
court concurred in the Quinn, Harper, Amato, and Ward holdings 
but, unwilling to wholly abandon the rule of caveat emptor by 
further extensions of a broker's liability to purchasers, the court 
distinguished the case a t  bar on its facts. 
Despite reluctance by some courts to depart from the tradi- 
tional view, however, it appears that prior to Funk v. Tifft courts 
55. Note 4 supra. 
56. 337 Mass. 376, 149 N.E.2d 366 (1958). 
57. Id. at  377-79, 149 N.E.2d at 368-69. 
58. Id. at  377, 381-82, 149 N.E.2d at 368, 370-71. 
59. 213 Va. 1, 189 S.E.2d 45 (1972). 
60. Id. at  1-2, 189 S.E.2d at  45. 
61. Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). Discussed notes 14-19 and 
accompanying text supra. 
62. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955). Discussed notes 26-32 
and accompanying text supra. 
63. Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537,79 So. 2d 873 (1955). Discussed notes 
48-53 and accompanying text supra. 
64. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736,336 P.2d 534 (1959). Discussed notes 40-47 and 
accompanying text supra. 
65. 213 Va. at 2, 189 S.E.2d at  45. 
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have been increasingly inclined to extend a real estate broker's 
liability to buyers. Based on either a fiduciary duty or a duty 
implied from statutes pertaining to brokers, some courts have 
imposed upon real estate brokers a duty to deal honestly and 
fairly with prospective purchasers. Liability has been imposed in 
cases where the broker has made affirmative misrepresentations 
to the prospective buyer or has concealed or failed to communi- 
cate the buyer's offer to the seller. Funk v. Tifft is a further 
extension of a real estate broker's liability to prospective purchas- 
ers. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held in Funk v. Tifft that the broker, Tifft, had breached his 
fiduciary duties of fairness and honesty when he outbid the Funks 
without notice to them before the seller had acted on their offer. 
In so holding, the court followed the modern trend of imposing 
upon real estate brokers a duty of fairness and honesty in their 
dealings with prospective buyers? t 
The Ninth Circuit relied primarily on the case of Quinn v. 
P h i p p ~ , ~ ~  wherein the Supreme Court of Florida imposed fidu- 
ciary duties on a broker who had agreed to communicate a buyer's 
offer and had further agreed to negotiate with the seller on the 
buyer's behalf. The court in the present case viewed the Quinn 
decision as controlling, stating that Quinn had held that when a 
broker undertakes to act as an intermediary between a seller and 
a prospective buyer and then purchases the property himself 
without notice to the buyer, the broker becomes a constructive 
trustee for the benefit of the buyer? 
66. 515 F.2d a t  25 (9th Cir. 1975). 
67. 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). Discussed notes 14-19 and accompanying text 
supra. 
Three additional cases were cited, but were not discussed: Mitchell v. Allison, 54 
N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949); Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710,276 N.W. 849 (1937); 
and Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959). In Mitchell, the buyer had 
employed the broker to purchase certain property for him at  $3 an acre. The court held 
the broker liable when he secretly purchased the property for himself a t  a higher price 
and then resold it to others. 54 N.M. a t  59-61, 213 P.2d at  233-34. In Stephenson, the court 
found that the broker who had been hired by the buyer had violated his duty of loyalty 
by purchasing the property for himself. The court held the broker to be a constructive 
trustee for the buyer's benefit. 279 Mich. a t  731, 734-46, 276 N.W. at  856, 857-62. Ward 
held the real estate broker liable for fraudulent misrepresentations to the buyer. 51 Cal. 
2d a t  742, 336 P.2d at  538. 
68. 515 F.2d at  25. 
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The court also relied upon the trial testimony of two Idaho 
real estate brokers that "a realtor who acts as an intermediary 
between a seller and a prospective buyer has a duty not to com- 
pete secretly with and outbid the prospective buyer when that 
buyer has made an offer on a piece of property and signed an 
earnest-money purchase agreement."Bg Furthermore, the court 
found that requiring brokers to make adequate disclosure to pro- 
spective buyers was consistent with the "standards of the Idaho 
real estate profession" and analogous to the disclosure require- 
ments of various "statutory enactments designed to protect the 
unknowing individual from the professional. ""The court con- 
cluded that imposing an obligation of disclosure on a broker who 
wishes to compete with prospective purchasers benefits the seller 
as well as the buyer. If a buyer is notified of the broker's compet- 
ing offer, he may choose to better the broker's 
Having found that Tifft had breached his fiduciary duty to 
the Funks, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal and di- 
rected the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the 
In contrast, the dissenting opinion denied the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship between Tifft and the Funks, and stated 
that neither precedent nor the findings of the district court sup- 
ported the court's finding of a fiduciary duty or breach.73 Deci- 
sions from other jurisdictions were cited for the proposition that 
"a broker for the seller can, with the seller's knowledge, outbid 
prospective buyers . . . ."?' The cases relied upon by the major- 
ity were distinguished on the ground that they involved situations 
in which the broker was the buyer's agent, made affirmative 
69. Id. 
70. Id. a t  25 n.2. The court cited three such statutes: The Truth in Lending Act, 15 
U.S.C. $ §  1601-65 (1970); the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 5  
1701-20 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. $§ 1701-03 (Supp. IV, 1974); and the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §$  77a-77aa (1970). 
71. 515 F.2d a t  25. 
72. 515 F.2d at  26. The court stated that: 
[Tlhe Funks [had] established the essential elements required for the imposi- 
tion of a constructive trust-the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, 
and the wrongful acquisition of the land by the breacher. 
Id. (citation omitted). It is not necessary, however, to prove the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship in order to impose a constructive trust. See note 32 supra. 
73. 515 F.2d at  27. 
74. Id. The cases cited were Ries v. Rome, 337 Mass. 376, 149 N.E.2d 336 (1958); 
Klotz v. Fauber, 213 Va. 1, 189 S.E.2d 45 (1972); and DiBurro v. Bonasia, 321 Mass. 12, 
71 N.E.2d 401 (1947). 
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misrepresentations, or underbid the prospective buyer's offer for 
the property. The dissent concluded that 
[wlhere the broker is not the agent of the prospective buyer, 
where he acts with the knowledge of his principal, the seller, 
where there is no misuse of confidential information, where 
there is no fraudulent misrepresentation, and where the broker 
bids more than any of the prospective buyers, there should be 
no liability on the part of the broker if the seller chooses to 
accept his offer without asking for another round of bids.75 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Funk u. Tifft significantly 
extends real estate brokers' duties to potential buyers. As the 
dissent pointed out, this is the first decision to hold a broker 
liable for a breach of affirmative duties owing to a buyer in which 
the broker was not the buyer's agent, did not conceal or fail to 
communicate the buyer's offer, and did not make fraudulent or 
deceitful misrepresentations. 
The case of Quinn v. P h i p p ~ , ~ % p o n  which the majority 
placed chief reliance, is distinguishable both on its facts and on 
its reasoning. The broker in Quinn had concealed the buyer's offer 
and purchased the property for himself for less than the buyer's 
bid after he had agreed not only to convey the offer, but also to 
negotiate with the seller on the buyer's behalf. The broker in the 
present case neither concealed the buyer's offer nor purchased the 
property for a price lower than the buyer's bid. In addition, the 
Quinn court in dictum indicated that if the broker and buyer 
"had been dealing a t  arm's length," then the broker "might not 
have been bound by his agreement to purchase" for the buyer.77 
In the present case, the broker had dealt a t  arm's length with 
several prospective purchasers, including the Funks.7R 
The Ninth Circuit also relied upon two other distinguishable 
cases:7Y Mitchell u. AllisonRD and Stephenson v. Golden? The 
brokers in these two cases had been employed by the buyers, not 








Id. at 28. 
93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). Discussed notes 14-19 and accompanying text 
93 Fla. at 816-17, 113 So. at 423. 
515 F.2d at 28 (dissenting opinion). 
See note 67 supra. 
54 N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949). 
81. 279 Mich. 710, 276 N.W. 849 (1937). 
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broker and buyer did not exist in the present case. Tifft had been 
employed by the seller and had disclosed to the Funks his agency 
relationship with the seller.R2 The Ninth Circuit further cited 
Ward u. Taggart."% Ward, however, the broker had made fraud- 
ulent misrepresentations to the buyer. No such misrepresen- 
tations were made in Funk v. Tifft. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision is not supported on its 
facts by the cases cited in the opinion. Further difficulties with 
the decision result from the court's finding of a fiduciary relation- 
ship between the parties and from the court's failure to place 
necessary limitations on the scope of the broker's duties to the 
buyer. 
A.  Source of the Broker's Duty: Fiduciary Relationship us. 
Public Policy 
As discussed above, the modern courts that have imposed 
duties upon real estate brokers to prospective purchasers have 
derived those duties either from a fiduciary relationship between 
the broker and buyerR4 or from public policy as expressed in par- 
ticular state statutes.V'he Ninth Circuit concluded that a fidu- 
ciary relationship existed between Tifft and the Funks and held 
Tifft liable for breach of his fiduciary duties to the Funks. The 
court did not, however, articulate the basis for its conclusion that 
a fiduciary relationship exists between a broker and a buyer. The 
court simply asserted that a broker has a duty to be fair and 
honest wtih a buyer and then appeared to derive this duty from 
a fiduciary relationship between the parties? 
The court found a fiduciary relationship between Tifft and 
the Funks despite the fact that Tifft had been the seller's agent 
prior to and during the time that he had dealt with the  funk^.^' 
As a result of his fiduciary relationship with the seller, Tifft's 
duties to the seller included a duty to refrain from acting ad- 
82. 515 F.2d a t  28 (dissenting opinion). 
83. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959). 
84. Note 10 and accompanying text supra. 
85. Note 11 and accompanying text supra. 
86. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court intended to impose upon the 
broker all the duties that evolve from a bona fide fiduciary relationship. The court held 
that "Tifft did breach the fiduciary duties he owed the Funks." However, the court's next 
statement appears to partially retract its finding of a fiduciary relationship: "When a real 
estate broker acts as an intermediary between a seller and a prospective buyer, he is under 
a duty to deal fairly and honestly with the prospective buyer." 515 F.2d at  25. 
87. See notes 3, 12 supra. 
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versely to the seller's interests in any manner, a duty to disclose 
all information that might have affected the seller's position, and 
a "duty to act aggressively and actively in furthering the [sel- 
ler's]  interest^."^^ It is unrealistic to expect the broker in a real 
estate transaction to be able to fulfill these fiduciary duties of 
utmost loyalty, care, and complete disclosure to both the buyer 
and the seller.Rg The irreconcilable conflicts which would neces- 
sarily arise were a broker required to act in a fiduciary capacity 
to two adverse parties would be further complicated if more than 
one potential buyer chose to bid on the property.g0 On the other 
hand, imposing a more limited duty on a real estate broker to deal 
honestly and fairly with potential buyers would not conflict with 
his agency relationship to the seller.g1 
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the Idaho Code or find that 
public policy imposed affirmative duties on licensed real estate 
brokers to be honest and fair in their dealings. Those states which 
have held that brokers owe a duty of fairness and honesty to 
buyers on grounds of public policy have relied on specific statu- 
tory provisions requiring brokers or applicants for brokerage li- 
censes to be ethical, trustworthy, and of good c h a r a ~ t e r . ~ ~  The 
Idaho Code does not include such express p rov i~ ions .~~  The Code 
does provide, however, that a broker may lose his license for any 
"conduct . . . which constitutes dishonest or dishonorable deal- 
ings . . . ."" The court could have concluded that, by virtue of 
the Idaho statutes that license and regulate real estate brokers, a 
broker is "granted a form of monopolywg5 and a status which 
impose an ethical duty upon him to deal honestly and fairly with 
all members of the public. In fact, had the court based its decision 
88. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 7 938.13, a t  370.113 (1974). 
89. See 35 BOST. U.L. REV. 604, 607 (1955). 
90. In Funk, several prospective buyers bid on the property. 515 F.2d at 28 (dissenting 
opinion). 
91. One commentator has suggested that courts should "recognize the fiduciary na- 
ture of the relationship between broker and buyer." He finds the public policy theory to 
be an undesirably "vague and guideless standard,". while asserting that "[ulnder the 
fiduciary approach the judiciary could examine new issues arising from broker-buyer 
relationships in the light of the established and defined duties of a fiduciary . . . ." He 
admits that finding a fiduciary relationship between the broker and buyer conflicts with 
and impairs the broker's agency contract with the seller, but fails to give a satisfactory 
solution for those inevitable conflicts. Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estatc 
Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1347-53 (1972). 
92. See notes 35-53 and accompanying text supra. 
93. IDAHO CODE §§  54-2022 to 2051 (Supp. 1975). 
94. Id. 8 54-2040(k). 
95. Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 98, 25 So. 2d 4, 4-5 (1946). 
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on public policy rather than on a fiduciary relationship, it could 
have avoided imposing the irreconcilable conflict of interest that 
arises when a broker is required to act in a fiduciary capacity to 
both adverse parties-buyer and seller-in a transaction. 
B. Scope of the Broker's Duty: Prohibited from Competing us. 
Required to Disclose 
I t  is clear that a real estate broker who has been hired by the 
seller cannot act in a fiduciary capacity toward prospective buy- 
ers. If the broker's obligations to prospective buyers are restricted 
to a duty to deal fairly and honestly, what does that duty require 
of the broker when he desires to submit a competing bid on the 
property? Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not clearly 
define or limit the broker's responsibilities in such a situation. 
Initially, the court states that the principal issue presented by the 
case is whether a broker "owes a fiduciary duty to a prospective 
buyer not to purchase a tract of land for himself while his pro- 
spective buyer's offer to buy that land is ou t~ tand ing . "~~  The 
majority goes on, however, to state that a broker's fiduciary du- 
ties of fairness and honesty are breached "when the real estate 
agent outbids the prospective buyer without notice to him before 
the seller has acted on his offer."97 Then, the majority asserts that 
the court is "merely giving force to the standards of the Idaho real 
estate profes~ion,"~%ut fails to clarify whether the standards of 
the profession require that a broker not bid a t  all on property for 
the purchase of which other offers are outstanding or whether a 
broker may compete with other prospective purchasers as long as 
he makes "adequate disclosures." At best, then, the court leaves 
confused the scope of a broker's duties when he wishes to compete 
with a prospective purchaser. 
A broker's obligation to deal honestly and fairly with poten- 
tial buyers should not include an absolute duty to refrain from 
submitting his own competing offer for real estate. The seller is 
entitled to the best price possible for his property, no matter who 
offers that price; indeed, when the broker is the seller's agent, he 
has a fiduciary duty to agressively promote the seller's interests 
by obtaining for the seller the highest bid on the property. Fur- 
thermore, since many real estate brokers are also in the business 
- - 
96. 515 F.2d at  24. 
97. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
98. Id. a t  25 n.2. 
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of investing in real estate, they should be allowed to compete 
freely with others for property.Yg 
There are, however, important reasons to impose a duty of 
disclosure upon brokers who compete with prospective purchasers 
to buy land. Inasmuch as a real estate broker is privy to confiden- 
tial information-the price and terms of other prospective buyers' 
offers-he has an unfair advantage in competing with those buy- 
ers. When a broker conveys a potential buyer's offer, the broker 
should then be required to disclose to that buyer the price and 
terms of any prior or subsequent offers he makes on the prop- 
erty.'") Article 12 of the Code of Ethics, published by the National 
Association of Realtors, is consistent with this view: 
The REALTOR shall not undertake to provide professional 
services concerning a property or its value where he has a pres- 
ent or contemplated interest unless such interest is specifically 
disclosed to all affected parties.In1 
Although he cannot reasonably be expected to owe broad 
fiduciary duties to both adverse parties to a transaction, when a 
broker undertakes to communicate a prospective buyer's offer to 
a seller, it is not unduly burdensome to require him to be respon- 
sible for the duties of fairness and honesty that arise in connec- 
tion with that  undertaking.lo2 Having agreed to convey the 
buyer's offer, the broker's duty of fairness and honesty should 
include a responsibility to fulfill the buyer's reasonable expecta- 
tion that the broker will not take unfair advantage of that confi- 
99. The actual purchaser of the property in Funk was a corporation. Shortly after 
Funk had submitted his offer, another prospective buyer, Richard Kahn, was shown the 
property by a salesman from the Tifft Agency. Mr. Kahn persuaded Tifft and his salesman 
to form a corporation for the purpose of purchasing the property. Kahn contributed $4,200 
of the downpayment and received 51% of the stock of the corporation. Tifft and his 
salesman contributed their commission and received 24.5% of the corporate stock each. 
At Kahn's request, Tifft telephoned the seller for her approval of the terms of their offer. 
Kahn testified that he would have purchased the property alone but was interested in 
having Tifft and his associate participate in the purchase in order to facilitate the subdivi- 
sion and resale of the property. Record, vol. 11, a t  263-82, Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 25 (9th 
Cir. 1975). 
100. See also Conant, Duties of  Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchrrse 
Shares, 46 CORNELL .Q. 53 (1960). The Securities and Exchange Commission and a 
growing number of state courts have held that, because of his superior access to informa- 
tion, a purchasing corporate insider has an affirmative duty to  make disclosures to the 
selling shareholder. Id. a t  72, 74. The corporate insider is not prevented from purchasing 
outstanding shares, but he must make appropriate disclosures. Similarly, the real estate 
broker should not be prevented from purchasing property, but should be required to make 
appropriate disclosures. Cf. 515 F.2d a t  25 n.2. 
101. J. LUMBLEAU, THE REAL ESTATOR 37 (2d ed. 1976). 
102. See 35 BOST. U.L. REV. 604, 608-09 (1955). 
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dential information. A broker should be obligated not only to 
communicate the buyer's offer faithfully and accurately, but also 
to disclose to all potential buyers with whom he has dealt his 
interest in, or his competing bid for, the property. As the court's 
opinion in the present case notes, requiring the broker to make 
such disclosures to the buyer also benefits the seller by helping 
him obtain the best price for his property.lm Thus, a disclosure 
requirement not only protects the interests of both the buyer and 
the seller, but also allows the broker and the buyer to compete 
on the same basis for the purchase of the property. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in the present case is a reasona- 
ble extension of the duties imposed upon real estate brokers in 
their dealings with buyers if it is interpreted as requiring a real 
estate broker to disclose to those potential buyers his interest in 
the property and any competing bids he submits on the property. 
Such a disclosure requirement is beneficial to both the buyer and 
the seller. It is submitted, however, that the Funk u. Tifft holding 
should not be interpreted broadly to impose upon the broker in 
his dealings with potential buyers the fiduciary duties of utmost 
loyalty, care, and complete disclosure that are traditionally asso- 
ciated only with true agency relationships. An imposition of such 
fiduciary obligations on the broker would conflict with his agency 
relationship with the seller and would prevent the broker from 
competing to purchase the property. 
